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Abstract 
In this review essay, we explore how Luhmann’s radical communication approach, which 
conceptualizes communication without recourse to human beings’ intentions, can reorient 
existing research on organizational communication. We show how Luhmann’s perspective 
puts decisions back into organizational communication studies, how it changes our 
perspective on organizational continuity and on organizational boundaries, and how it 
redirects our understanding of human agency in organizations. We also discuss three areas in 
which Luhmann’s theory could draw inspiration from other research on organizational 
communication. Keywords: autopoiesis, communication, Niklas Luhmann, organization 
studies, systems theory. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With his suggestion to conceptualize organizational communication without recourse 
to human beings’ intention, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann has offered a radically 
new perspective on communicational phenomena in organizations. Luhmann developed this 
new perspective across numerous publications culminating in a comprehensive theory of 
organizations as self-reproducing sytems of communications. These writings, particularly the 
magnum opus Organization and Decision (Luhmann, 2018), contain many fascinating new 
insights that have the potential to reorient existing research on organizational communication. 
Yet, while Luhmann is considered one of the most influential organization theorists in 
the German-speaking world, his works have received only little recognition from organization 
scholars at the international level. Despite fragmented attempts at introducing Luhmann’s 
approach to organization scholars internationally (Bakken and Hernes, 2003; Hernes and 
Bakken, 2003; Schoeneborn, 2011; Seidl and Becker, 2005, 2006; Czarniawska, 2017), and at 
mobilizing his ideas in examining specific aspects of organization studies such as 
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boundaryless careers (Becker and Haunschild, 2003), organizational identity (Seidl 2005), the 
theory-practice gap (Kieser and Leiner, 2009), sustainability (Valentinov, 2012; 2013), 
organizational values (Schnebel, 2000), organizational technologies (van Lier, 2013), 
Luhmann remains, as of today, a relatively marginal figure in organization studies.  
 Apart from the complexity of his writing, a main reason for this neglect of his theory 
is the lack of translations of his main works on organization. Without such translations, the 
engagement with his organization theory had to remain on the superficial level of those few 
glimpses of his work that German-speaking authors have provided with their own 
interpretations of Luhmann’s work, which ‘do not give a full grasp of his achievements’ 
(Thyssen, 2012: 117). Yet, with the recent translation into English of Luhmann’s (2018) 
magnum opus on organizations, there is now the opportunity for a fuller and deeper 
engagement with his thinking in organization studies in general and organizational 
communication research in particular, as all researchers will be able to consult the original 
text.  
We take this publication as an opportunity to discuss how Luhmann’s approach can 
contribute to our understanding of the communicative dimension of organizations and thereby 
to the burgeoning literature on the communicative constitution of organizations (CCO), which 
proposes  that organizations should essentially be considered the products of communicative 
activities (Ashcraft, Kuhn and Cooren, 2009; Cooren, 2000, 2015; Kuhn, Ashcraft and 
Cooren, 2017; McPhee and Zaug, 2000; Robichaud, Giroux and Taylor, 2004; Schoeneborn 
and Vásquez, 2017; Taylor and Van Every, 2000, 2011, 2014). 
In the following we start by introducing Luhmann’s take on organizations as self-
reproducing communication systems. Yet, rather than summarizing his organization theory, 
which would be impossible within the scope of an article given the complexity of the work, 
we will distil what we consider his key insights and claims with regard to the communicative 
 4 
dimension of organizations. This is followed by a discussion of how these insights and claims 
can enrich and re-direct existing organizational communication scholarship. After that, we 
will also briefly reflect on possibilities of extending Luhmann’s theory with insights from 
other communication theories. We conclude with some general reflections on how to use 
Luhmann’s approach in the context of other existing communication approaches. 
KEY ASPECTS OF LUHMANN’S COMMUNICATION APPROACH TO 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) was one of the most important German sociologists of 
the Twentieth century. Having started out as a lawyer and having worked in that function for 
several years, a scholarship to go to Harvard University inspired him to embark on an 
academic career in the social sciences. After various positions at several German universities, 
Luhmann ended up at the University of Bielefeld, where he developed his distinctive 
communication approach to the social world in general and to organizations in particular. In 
what follows, we will introduce the key aspects of Luhmann’s theory of organization first 
before discussing its implications for organization communication research. Given the 
complexity of Luhmann’s approach, it is necessary to grasp the overall architecture of the 
theory first in order to be able to appreciate its implications for organizational communication 
studies. 
Communications as basic elements of the social world 
 Niklas Luhmann is often referred to as a theorist of society (Luhmann 2012), which 
was the key focus of his work. However, during his entire career, he took a great interest in 
organizations as well and developed a very distinctive organization theory. The most 
elaborate version of this organization theory is presented in his book Organization and 
Decision (Luhmann, 2018), which was originally published in German in 2000, two years 
after his death. Yet, his organization theory has to be seen in the wider context of his approach 
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to the social world in general, which he outlined in a range of other books (e.g. Luhmann 
1995; 2012a). Key to Luhmann’s general approach to the social world is the conceptualization 
of the social domain as constituted exclusively of verbal and non-verbal communication. That 
is, Luhmann treats communication rather than individuals or action as the basic concept of 
social theory (Luhmann, 1995).  
 Drawing on Bühler’s (1990/1934) classical communication theory, Luhmann 
conceptualizes communication as the unity of utterance, information and understanding: an 
utterance is understood as conveying a particular information. Yet, Luhmann adds an 
important twist to this classical conceptualization. Instead of focussing on how the involved 
human beings interiorly understand the utterance, he directs the attention to the understanding 
that is displayed in the response to the focal communication. Given that nobody has any direct 
access to how a person interiorly understands an utterance (except, of course, that person 
herself), in the communicational world, understanding is only something that can be assessed 
on the way it is displayed by the next turn of talk, a position that is perfectly congruent with 
one of the main tenets of conversation analysis (Schegloff, 1991). 
To illustrate this point, let’s take the following sequence of communications between a 
customer and a salesperson: “I don’t need a receipt” – “Sorry, but I have to charge VAT.” 
Implied in the response to the first communication is an understanding of the customer’s 
utterance as a suggestion to keep the sales transaction off record in order not to pay any taxes 
on it. This is a very different understanding than if the response had been “Great, then we 
don’t have to waste any paper,” which implies an understanding of the first utterance as just 
referring to the physical object (even though we would have to wait for the response to the 
response to establish how the response is understood in turn).  Here, we focus just on the 
understanding as materialized in the responses, leaving aside what the involved human beings 
might be thinking during this conversation (the salesperson might think that the customer is 
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suggesting to keep the transaction off record but for whatever reason still say, “Great, then we 
don’t have to waste any paper”). For all practical purposes, what people might be thinking or 
understanding can certainly be of import to the interlocutors themselves, but as long as the 
latter do not materialize in the discussion, whether implicitly or explicitly, these matters are 
not talked into being (Heritage, 1984), which means that, from a communicational point of 
view, they do not exist. 
This seemingly small twist that consists of focussing on the understanding displayed in 
the response rather than on the understanding in the human beings’ minds has far reaching, 
theoretical consequences. Since the response communication determines how the initial 
communication is understood, the person making the utterance has no control over the 
communication. Instead, it is the responding communication that determines the focal 
communication by displaying a particular understanding. Yet, as the response communication 
itself is only determined by the response to the response communication, the person uttering 
the response has no control over the communication either. Instead, the communications 
around the focal communications determine the focal communication through the 
understanding displayed in them. Luhmann, in this sense, speaks of communication as an 
autonomous realm of reality, which is not determined by the intentions or thoughts of human 
beings.  
To underline this point, Luhmann (2002: 169) provocatively stated: ‘Humans cannot 
communicate; not even their brains can communicate; not even their conscious minds can 
communicate. Only communications can communicate.” This is obviously an overstatement 
as we constantly witness situations where people appear to communicative seamlessly. For 
instance, if X asks Y to pass her a file and that Y extends it to her, a gesture to which X 
responds by thanking him, one can reasonably say that X and Y communicated successfully. 
However, what Luhmann means is that we do not need to know what is in X’s and Y’s minds 
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to precisely conclude that communication took place and succeeded. The mutual 
understanding is displayed in the communications themselves, which is all that matters from a 
social viewpoint. We therefore no longer need to ask “who is saying something?” as 
everything is said in and by the communications. 
 This also means that individual units of communication can only come about as part of 
a sequence of communications, or as Luhmann would say: a system of communications. The 
most general form of such a system of communications is our society (Luhmann, 2012b, 
2013). Society encompasses all communications and “everything that is communication is 
society” (Luhmann 1995: 408). In other words, communications constitute the building blocks 
by which society get reproduced and transformed, which explains why what is in people’s 
mind does not ultimately matter, socially and organizationally speaking. 
 In line with this general understanding of the social world as constituted by an 
autonomous realm of communications rather than individuals or actions, Luhmann developed 
his theory of organizations as particular communicative phenomena, made up of particular 
types of communication, within society. As we will discuss in more detail below, this 
conceptualization of the social world as made up exclusively of communications has far-
reaching consequences as it forces the organization researcher to trace all organizational 
phenomena, whether organizational boundaries or managerial agency, back to 
communications and their dynamics. It also means that we have to distinguish clearly between 
the social world as the world of communication and the worlds of the individuals as worlds 
made up of thoughts in their respective minds, which might trigger communications but as 
thought can never become part of the social world as such. 
Capturing how organizations distinguish themselves from the rest of society 
 Having conceptualized society as the all-encompassing system of communication (i.e., 
all communications are part of our world-spanning society), Luhmann treats organizations as 
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particular systems within that realm of communication. These systems are distinguished from 
the rest of society by the fact that they are made up of a particular type of communications, 
i.e. of particular units of utterance, information and understanding. Luhmann refers to this 
type of communications as decision communications (or simply: “decisions”, since Luhmann 
does not distinguish between decisions and decision communications as we will explain 
below). While we might find decision communications also outside of organizations, for 
Luhmann organizations are the only systems that consist entirely of decision communications. 
 Luhmann defines decision communications as a kind of complex communication; a 
decision communication contains information about a particular content (e.g., “We will invest 
in machine X…”) but at the same time it also contains information about alternatives to that 
content (e.g. “… and we won’t invest in machine Z” or “… instead of continuing to produce 
on the existing machine”) or at least the fact that there are alternatives. It also contains 
information, at least implicitly, about “its reasons, its justification, the effort involved” 
(Luhmann, 2018: 148). Because of the different aspects that are combined in a decision 
communication, Luhmann speaks of decision communications as particular types of “compact 
communications” (Luhmann, 2018: 148). Often the different aspects of a single decision are 
realized as several “normal” communications (each consisting of utterance, information and 
understanding) which are bundled together into a decision communication. 
It is this particular type of communication that distinguishes the organization from the 
rest of society. Taking this line of argument even a step further, Luhmann suggests that with 
this characterization of the organization, he as researcher is not just imposing this distinction 
between different types of communications onto the world but organizations themselves use 
this distinction to identify themselves. That is, organizations themselves, as Luhmann claims, 
refer (explicitly or implicitly) to their decision communications whenever they refer to 
themselves, e.g. they refer to the mission statement that was decided on. And every decision 
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communication also distinguishes between the decision communications that it can treat as part 
of the same organization, and thus can use as basis for justifying itself as particular decision, 
and other communications that are not considered part of the same organization. 
To stress the point that organizations consist just of interconnected decision 
communications and nothing else (in particular, not of individuals), Luhmann appropriates the 
biological concept of autopoietic systems (Maturana and Varela 1992), i.e. self-reproducing 
systems, which was originally put forward by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela (1992), and re-interprets it as a sociological concept (Seidl, 2005). 
Autopoietic systems, as Luhmann describes them, are systems that are not just distinguished 
analytically by the researcher but are systems that actively generate a distinction between 
themselves and their environment. Luhmann explains: “If we describe organizations as 
autopoietic systems, we are […] concerned with the generation and reproduction of a 
difference (systems-theoretically: between system and environment), and the concept of 
autopoiesis means that an observer who uses it presupposes that this difference is generated 
by the system itself and reproduced by systemic operations” (Luhmann, 2018: 35; italics in 
original).  
Together, this leads Luhmann to define organizations as autopietic systems that are 
“made up of decisions, and capable of completing the decisions that make them up, through 
the decisions that make them up” (Luhmann, 2003: 32). Nassehi (2005: 185) in this sense also 
speaks of organizations as “decision machines,” that is, as a network of interconnected 
decisions that produces further decisions. Hence, whatever decisions are interconnected in 
that way we can speak of an organization. This also means that all decisions that are 
connected in that way belong to that organization and those that are not connected in that way 
belong either to other organizations or are “free-floating” decisions in society at large. 
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 This conceptualization of organizations as demarcating themselves from the 
environment through their decision communications also means that every new decision 
communication that is produced reproduces the demarcation between the organization and its 
environment. Interestingly, this means that we can no longer speak of a boundary that 
demarcates what is inside and what is outside the organization. Instead, it is the system of 
interconnected decision communications that, for each communication, determines whether it 
is treated as part of the organization or not, i.e. whether it should be understood as a decision 
communication of that particular organization or not. Also empirically we can observe 
decision communications that deliberate what communications can be treated as decisions and 
which ones not. This forces the organizational communication researcher to pay much more 
attention to the ways in which the organizational communications determine which 
communications to treat as part of the organization and which ones not, as we will discuss in 
more detail below. 
The paradox of decision at the heart of the organization 
 In elaborating on his concept of organizations as systems made up of decisions. 
Luhmann (2018: 2005) draws on some central concepts from classical organization theory 
and “reformulates” them on the basis of his particular communication perspective (Luhmann, 
2018: 51). The first concept reformulated in this way is the very concept of decision itself. 
While classical organization theory distinguishes between taking a decision and 
communicating the decision, Luhmann collapses the distinction, treating decisions as forms of 
communication. As he writes: “Decision is not understood as a psychological mechanism, but 
as a matter of communication, not a psychological event in the form of an internally 
conscious definition of the self, but as a social event. That makes it impossible to state that 
decisions already taken still have to be communicated.” (Luhmann 2003: 32).   
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 Accordingly, the classical notion of decision as process of choosing one amongst 
several alternatives (March, 1994) is re-described as communicating the selection of one 
alternative amongst other possible alternatives. This results in paradoxical communications, 
as Luhmann (2018: 111) highlights: 
The decision has to inform about itself, but also about the alternative, thus about the 
paradox that the alternative is an alternative (for otherwise the decision would not be a 
decision) and at the same time not an alternative (for otherwise the decision would not 
be a decision).  
Hence, other than the decision-making literature or even the literature on organizational 
communication has acknowledged, decision communications are self-contradictory 
communications. On the one hand, decision communications communicate that there are real 
alternatives to the selected alternative and hence, that the other alternatives could have been 
chosen equally well – otherwise there is nothing to decide. On the other hand, decision 
communications communicate that the selected alternative is the right alternative to select and 
that the other alternatives are not “real” alternatives – otherwise the selected alternative would 
not be accepted as already decided. Hence, decision communications have to communicate 
both that there are and are not alternatives. 
 This paradoxical form makes decisions, on the one hand, very fragile, in the sense of 
being constantly at risk of being deconstructed, i.e. of being questioned, but on the other hand, 
it provides them with a power, which Luhmann, drawing on another classical concept (March 
& Simon, 1958) referred to as “uncertainty absorption”: Decisions, to the extent that they are 
not questioned but taken as basis for further decision making, provide ensuing decisions with 
stable points of reference, i.e., with selected alternatives; for the ensuing decisions the 
uncertainties involved in the original decision do not matter anymore – the decision has 
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already been taken (whether it was a good or bad decision is irrelevant for the ensuing 
decision).  
 As Luhmann writes: “Uncertainty absorption takes place, […] when decisions are […] 
taken as the basis for subsequent decisions” (Luhmann 2005b: 96). Hence, compared to the 
succession of “normal” communications, the information processing by decisions turns 
uncertainties into certainties. This capacity of decisions to absorb uncertainty also results in a 
particular capacity to establish organizational structures. Drawing on another classical concept 
(March and Simon, 1958), Luhmann refers to these structures as “decision premises.” He 
defines decision premises as explicit decisions about a range of other decisions. For example, 
organizations, that is, the network of decisions, produce decisions on decision programs such 
as strategies or policies that provide stable points of reference for future decision making. 
 In order to reduce the risk of decisions being deconstructed, i.e. questioned by ensuing 
decisions, and the organization to collapse, organizations have established forms of 
“deparadoxification,” i.e., of hiding the paradox of decisions (Seidl and Becker, 2006 
Knudsen, 2005). The first form of deparadoxification is the reference of decisions to decision 
premises; thereby the focal decisions appear as “derived” from and legitimated through 
decision premises. For example, the decision to acquire a new company may be 
communicated as a direct consequence of the decision premise to grow the business through 
acquisitions. This reference to decision premises shifts the attention away from the focal 
decisions to the decision premise. The second form of deparadoxification is the construction 
of the “operational fiction” (Luhmann, 2018: 67) of a decision maker. That is, in the decision 
communications the decisions are typically attributed to decision makers, as if the decisions 
were produced by the decision makers rather than by the network of decisions. As a result, the 
focus of ensuing decision communications are shifted from the focal decisions to the motives 
of the decision makers and thereby out of the communication. 
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 The risk of deconstruction, i.e. the risk of exposing the paradox at the heart of the 
decision, is further reduced through the fact that decisions are totalized in organizations as the 
only form of organizational communication. As explained above, organizations consist only 
of decisions and hence the deconstruction of decisions can also just take place in the form of 
decisions, which as a consequence would result in further decisions and thus continue the 
reproduction of the organization. To be sure, there are also other communications “around” 
the decision processes, e. g. gossip, but those communications are not part of the recursive 
network of decisions and hence not part of the organization as conceptualized by Luhmann.   
  As we will discuss in more detail below, Luhmann’s conceptualization of 
organizations as constituted of decision communications, on the one hand, brings decisions 
(back) into organization communication studies. As Luhmann’s analysis highlights, decision 
communications are a distinctive form of communication, which poses challenges and yield 
different consequences than the communications typically studied by organizational 
communication scholars. On the other hand, this conceptualization connects organizational 
communication research back to the classical organization theory of the Carnegie School, 
allowing to build on the insights of this important stream of research. Yet, rather than re-
introducing the existing concepts from classical organization theory, Luhmann re-interprets 
the concepts from his communication perspective giving them a new meaning and thereby 
new analytical power. 
Information processing through decision communications 
 By describing organizations as constituted by decision communications and nothing 
else, Luhmann develops a radically temporal perspective on organizations. Decision 
communications, like all communications, are “events occurring at a fixed point in time and 
then disappear” (Luhmann, 2003: 35); i. e. the decision communication just happens at a 
particular moment and does not extend beyond that. This is not to deny that decisions can 
 14 
have long-lasting effects but the decisions as events do not persist over time. This means that 
in order for an organization to persist over time, the network of decisions has to ensure that its 
decisions are followed by further decisions; once the succession of decisions stops, the 
organization disappears.  
Hence, in line with process theorists in management studies (e.g. Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002; Langley et al. 2013; Langley and Tsoukas, 2016), Luhmann suggests a reversal of the 
traditional perspective on continuity and discontinuity – where organizations are considered to 
be in constant flux and stability or persistence are the phenomena in need of explanation. Yet, 
as Luhmann explains, this focus on decision events also goes beyond the existing process 
theorizing ; in fact, in some sense it is even in opposition to it: While processes, as described 
by Langley and Tsoukas (2016) and others, extend across time and thus have (at least) some 
temporal continuity, events happen as points in time and have no continuity whatsoever. 
Luhmann writes: 
“[T]he theory presumes discontinuity, continuous disintegration, and considers 
continuity (thingness, substance, process) to need explaining. A theory […] construed 
in this manner is in radical opposition to all sorts of process theories, including 
dialectical theories. It rejects any sort of ‘essentialism’ and, on the contrary, demands 
that every event (or in our field every decision) leave the following one to a 
subsequent event.” (Luhmann, 2018: 30). 
 For the continuation of the organization, it only matters that decisions are 
continuously produced but not what particular decisions are produced, as long as the decisions 
possess “connectivity” (Luhmann, 2018: 36). The concept of “connectivity” refers to the 
ability of decisions to connect to other decisions; that is, decisions need to possess 
connectivity so that new decisions can connect to them and thereby ensure the continuation of 
the organization. Like all communications, decisions typically call forth ensuing decisions. 
 15 
For example, the decision to create a new position in the organization calls forth an ensuing 
decision on hiring a person to fill the position. Once this person has been selected, she will 
then be positioned as having to make subsequent decisions in connection with her new 
responsibility, and so on and so forth. 
 Luhmann suggests that we conceptualize this process of decisions connecting to 
ensuing decisions as information processing and the entire organization as an information 
processing system. Drawing on Bateson’s (1979: 250) definition of information as “any 
difference that makes a difference,” Luhmann argues that decisions serve as information (that 
has been uttered and which needs to be understood as well) to ensuing decisions: they are 
differences that make a difference in the decisions that follow. However, what difference a 
decision makes in ensuing decisions is only determined by the ensuing decision itself; that is, 
the ensuing decision reads a particular difference into the preceding decision, which it takes as 
point of reference for itself as a decision. In this sense we can also say that it is ensuing 
decisions that determine retrospectively the meaning of the earlier decisions and whether they 
are to be treated as decisions at all – if a decision does not make a difference in later decisions 
it is not a decision.  
 Taking this a step further, Luhmann argues that all information that is processed 
within the succession of decisions is generated by the organization itself, i.e., by the network 
of decisions. In the same way as decisions read particular differences into preceding 
decisions, they also read particular differences into the environment, where the environment is 
constituted of everything that is not part of the organizational network of decisions. Those 
differences that the decisions read into the environment are then used as occasions for further 
decision making. For example, organizations might read a change in customer behavior into 
the environment requiring a decision to change the marketing campaign. Thus, the 
information that the organization extracts from its environment  is not just existing out there 
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to be picked up but is constructed by the organization itself. In other words, what 
environmental differences make a difference to the decision-making process depends on the 
decision-making process.  
 Luhmann in this sense writes: 
The concept of difference replaces the concept of fact, which is no longer needed 
thanks to the assumption that systems react only to differences that they make 
themselves, which therefore do not need to exist ‘out there’ but have to be constructed 
‘inside’ (Bateson incidentally understands facts as the infinity of possible differences 
to which systems can react only by determining what differences make a difference for 
it in deciding its own states). (Luhmann, 2018: 37) 
This notion of organizations as information-processing systems leads to the concept of 
“operational closure,” where operational closure means “that the system can operate only in 
the context of its own operations” (Luhmann 2018: 33), yet, as we will elaborate this does not 
imply a classical closed system view according to which the environment would be irrelevant. 
 Since information is always relative to the system, that is, since the difference that a 
difference makes in the information-processing system, i.e. in the organization, is constructed 
by the operations of the system itself, all operations of information processing are by 
definition part of the information-processing system itself – no information processing 
operations can be introduced from outside. In this sense, Luhmann writes: “All operations of 
the system are information processing. We thus merely repeat that [organizations] are 
operationally closed systems” (Luhmann, 2018: 37; italics in the original). This operative 
closure also applies to the relation between the organization and human beings. Not even 
human beings can introduce information into the communication system, although 
communication presupposes the participation of human beings.  
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Luhmann captures this relation between the communication system and the human 
beings with the concept of interpenetration. By that he means that the communication system 
makes use of the complex operations of the mind as if those operations were part of the 
communication system (Luhmann 1995: 2013). This is analogous to what we do when using a 
computer to calculate something – we do not need to understand what is going on in the 
computer, and the operations of the computer do not become operations of our mind, but we 
can still make use of the results the computer displays on the screen (e.g., the calculation the 
computer produces on the screen counts as what we calculated). In the same way, as Luhmann 
writes, the organization has human beings “at its disposal” (Luhmann, 2018: 32) to provide 
“irritations” that the organization can make use of in producing communications. For 
example, when a question is communicated, the communication system can rely on the 
addressed human being to react by creating a sound or a gesture that can be “used” as basis 
for reading a response communication into it, independently of what the human being “really” 
thought or intended. 
Luhmann stresses that this strict separation between the organization’s own 
information processing and that of other systems in its environment enables the organization 
to produce information at all. This leads to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that 
operational closure, i.e., the fact that all operations of information processing are produced by 
the system itself and cannot be introduced from outside, is the precondition for being open to 
processing information about the internal and external world. 
 This conceptualization of organizations as operatively closed communication systems, has 
important consequences for theorizing the relation between the organization and its environment. 
This means that the impact of operations outside the organization, such as the communications of 
other organizations or the thoughts of their organizational members, is determined by the focal 
organization’s communication processes. As Luhmann stresses, these external operations can 
merely cause “irritations” (Luhmann 2018: 55) in the communication process which might trigger 
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further communications, but what communications they might trigger is determined by the 
communication process and not the irritation. In other words, external operations can never enter 
the organization as such but the organization can read particular differences into them, which it 
then uses as occasions for further communications. Thus, what internal communications are 
triggered by external operations and whether any internal communications are triggered at all, 
depends entirely on the internal organizational communication processes themselves. This has 
also important consequences for theorizing the agency of organizational members: The 
organizational members can only impact the organizational communications to the extent and in 
the way that the organizational communications allow for. As we will discuss below, this means 
that the agency of the organizational members has to be treated as communicatively constructed. 
HOW LUHMANN CAN INSPIRE STUDIES ON THE COMMUNICATIVE 
DIMENSION OF ORGANIZATION 
 As we have shown above, Luhmann offers a radical communication perspective on 
organizations, which conceptualizes organizations and the communications of which they are 
made up without recourse to human beings’ intentions. In the following, we will elaborate on 
how Luhmann’s perspective relates to and can inspire existing research on organizational 
communication. We will argue that even if we do not follow all of Luhmann’s suggestions, in 
particular, even if we do not follow his suggestion of conceptualizing organization as 
consisting of decision communications only, he can offer important inspirations to 
organizational communication scholarship.  
In particular, we discuss how Luhmann’s perspective (1) puts decisions back into 
organizational communication studies, how it changes our perspective (2) on organizational 
continuity and (3) on organizational boundaries, and (4) how it redirects our understanding of 
human agency in organizations. For each of these four areas we highlight exemplary 
contemporary themes in organizational communication research to which Luhmann has 
something specific to say, including recent research on strategy as discourse, the 
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communicative constitution of organizational identity, the polyphonic nature of organizations 
and leadership as communicatively enacted. 
Putting decisions back into organizational communication research 
 As explained, one of the key points Luhmann insists on throughout his work is that 
anything that participates in the re-production of an organization has to be treated as the result 
of a decision communication. Whether these results consist of a specific function, procedure, 
plan, etc., its instantiation has to be decided upon at some point. While the existing literature 
on the communicative constitution of organizations highlight that organizations are made of 
communications (Cooren, 2000; McPhee and Zaug, 2000; Taylor, Cooren, Giroux and 
Robichaud, 1996; Taylor and Van Every, 2000), Luhmann’s work draws our attention to  the 
differences between different types of organizational communication. In particular, it 
highlights that decision communications play a distinctive role in that constuitution and that 
we should acknowledge that role. 
While also relevant to organizational communication studies in general, Luhmann’s 
detailed analysis of the particularities of decision communications speaks directly to the 
recent discussions about the communicative constitution of strategy-making (Aten and 
Thomas, 2016; Bencherki, Basque and Rouleau, in press; Cabantous, Gond and Wright, 2018; 
Cooren. Bencherki, Chaput, and Vásquez, 2015; Pälli, 2018; Vásquez, Bencherki, Cooren, 
and Sergi, 2018). This research is directly concerned with processes of strategic decision 
making, examining the way in which they are communicatively constituted. Yet, the 
respective research has hardly paid any attention to the decision communication as a 
particular type of communication. Taking Luhmann seriously, even if one doesn’t want to 
adopt his theoretical approach in its entirety, means treating such decision processes not only 
as empirical context for studying organizational communications but to pay particular 
attention to decision communication as pivotal communicative events in the unfolding 
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communication process. After all, as Luhmann revealed, decision communications affect the 
dynamics of the communication in very distinctive ways. 
 Indeed, decisions create stable points of reference within the organizational 
communication; the communication can rely on what has been decided, that is, what has been 
instantiated and established so far. In other words, decisions are the ways by which 
organizations organize themselves, so to speak. Taking Luhmann’s approach we can 
understand organizations as literally made of decisions to the extent that the result of these 
decisions constitutes what it ends up being made of and how it evolves throughout space and 
time, whether we speak about successive versions of organizational charts that defined how it 
was officially structured, strategic plans that consecutively determined where resources would 
be focused on, or even buildings that were progressively erected, bought or sold in its name. 
In other words, decisions communicate into being what constitute organizations. 
 Even if we do not follow Luhmann in conceptualizing organizations as consisting of 
decision communications only, we can read Luhmann’s work as an invitation to 
organizational communication scholars to pay more attention to the particularities of decision 
communications in the constitution of organizations, not only because they absorb 
uncertainty, but also because of their paradoxicality. Analyzing the details of communication 
episodes, which is one of the trademarks of a communicative perspective on organization, 
would then consist of singularizing these specific moments where a collective course of action 
appears to be agreed upon to the detriment of others. Interestingly, one could then show how 
what we have referred to as the “game of authority” (Fauré, Cooren and Matte, 2019), which 
is usually implied in this kind of situation, can also be seen as another form of 
deparadoxification, i. e. of hiding the paradox, of the decision-making process.  
By games of authority, we mean interactions where the authors/sources/origins/ 
premises of decisions are multiplied, which tends to obscure the paradoxicality of the 
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decisions that are being made, rendering them less deconstructible. Deparadoxifying the 
decision-making process in this way thus could be described as consisting of multiplying the 
elements of a situation that are presented as dictating that a particular course of action be 
followed (Cooren, 2010). For instance, presenting a decision as being taken in the name of 
profitability, equity and environmental protection amounts to presenting these three matters as 
dictating that such a decision be made. Deparadoxification thus takes place as decisions 
appear to derive not from the decision itself, but from what leads to this decision. Showing 
within the decision communication that many elements of a situation call for a specific course 
of action indeed amounts to demonstrating that there is, in fact, no alternative while, by 
definition, the very existence of a decision does imply, as Luhmann reminds us, the existence 
of alternatives.  
 Beyond a focus on explicit decision communications, adopting a Luhmannian 
perspective invites us also to pay attention to the fact that even communications that are not 
explicitly framed as decisions might be treated as decisions by later decision communications. 
For example, communicating that one is leaving the office earlier today might be treated in 
later employee appraisal decisions as a decision to ignore the decisions on official working 
hours. This uncertainty about whether something will be treated as a decision communication 
or just as ordinary communication belonging to the environment is likely to affect both the 
decision communications and the “normal” communications around the organization.  
Accordingly, we might start to examine the different ways in which the 
communication processes (both the decision communications and other communications 
around it) deal with this uncertainty of how they will be understood. Looking more closely at 
organizational communication processes, we often find, on the one hand, that some 
communications are explicitly flagged as decisions, e.g. “we have now decided…”, in order to 
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increase the chance that ensuing decision communications will treat them as such. We might 
think of meeting minutes which explicitly highlight that particular decisions have been taken. 
While this increases the chance that these communications will be treated as decisions 
it is still no guarantee. After all, these communications could just be ignored by later decision 
communications. Interestingly, we often find explicit attempts at deconstructing such decision 
communications in order to prevent them from having any impacting on the other decision 
communications. For example, we can often observe how particular decision communications 
are accused of being in “breach of procedure”, i. e. in conflict with earlier decisions, and 
hence should not be treated as decisions (and since decisions are only decisions to the extent 
that they are treated as such by later decisions, those decisions wouldn’t be decisions). 
On the other hand, we also find that communications around the organization might be 
explicitly flagged as non-decisions so that they may not be treated as decisions by the 
organizational decision process. For example, people might present some suggestions for a 
potential decision but highlight that these are to be interpreted just as initial thoughts and not 
as decisions – and hence not part of the organization. Often, we can also observe how 
particular communications during a business meeting are explicitly kept “off record” and 
hence off the official meeting minutes in order to prevent the interpretation of those 
communications as decisions – and thus as part of the organization. Yet, there is never a 
guarantee that such communications will not be interpreted as such and thereby become part 
of the organization.  
Even the communication about keeping communications “off record” might be 
interpreted as decisions by later decision communications, possibly resulting in decisions 
about penalties. Taken together, organizational communication research might gain a better 
understanding of the dynamics of communication by paying more attention to how the 
difference between decision and non-decisions is handled communicatively. In our own work 
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(Cooren, 2004, 2015), for example, we have shown how texts, i.e. written or otherwise 
recorded communication, play a key constitutive role in organizational settings, but Luhmann 
could help us show how these texts have such a constitutive role because they serve as ways 
by which decisions are officialised and thereby treated as such (see also Brummans, 2007; 
Taylor and Van Every, 2000, 2014).  
Focussing attention on the production of organizational continuities by discontinuities 
 As we pointed out, a key issue in Luhmann’s treatment of organizations, and social 
systems in general, is their fragile nature. Organizations are made up of communicative events 
that have no temporal continuity; they happen just as points in time. Hence, organizations 
only persist over time to the extent that communications are followed by further 
communications. After each communication the organization could break down and 
discontinue if no communication is to follow.  
 Taking this seriously means that organizational communication researchers might 
want to pay more attention to the ways in which an organizational communication process 
ensures the continuous production of further communications, an aspect that tends to be 
downplayed in current studies on organizational communication, which often cruelly suffer 
from a lack of concerns for longitudinality (Fairhurst and Cooren, 2018). Adopting a 
Luhmannian perspective we might re-interpret many mundane organizational processes as 
constituting occasions for the production of further decision communications and thus for the 
continuation of the organization. For example, the communication of a new strategy creates 
opportunities for decisions about implementing the strategy or the ambiguity of decision 
communications might themselves create occasions for further decision communications 
about the interpretation of those decisions. 
 Apart from the mere continuation of the reproduction of communications, the 
conceptualization of organizations as consisting of communicative events also directs our 
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attention to the question of organizational identity, which is an important theme in the 
organizational communication literature  (Albu and Etter, 2016; Bencherki and Snack, 2016; 
Bruscella and Bisel, 2018; Dobusch and Schoeneborn, 2015; Frandsen, Kuhn, and Wolff 
Lundholt, 2016; Koschmann, 2013; Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman, 2019; Wilhoit and 
Kisselburgh, 2015).  While the existing literature focusses particularly on the construction of 
organizational identity through “identity claims” (Dobusch and Schoeneborn, 2015) and 
“authoritative texts” (Koschmann, 2013; Kuhn, 2008), which are communicative accounts 
about the enduring characteristics of the organization, the Luhmannian perspective  also 
directs attention to the way recognizable characteristics are generated in the ongoing flow of 
communications.  
From a Luhmannian perspective, such continuity can be explained as the result of 
earlier communications affecting later communications; in other words, earlier 
communications are “present” in later communications in terms of the difference that they 
make to them. This is a form of continuity made of discontinuities. Hence, to better 
understand how this continuity is generated, organizational communication researchers might 
want to follow up on and examine closely this successive ‘impregnation’ (Luhmann 2018: 
127) of decisions communications through earlier decision communications; that is, they may 
want to examine how earlier decisions express themselves in later decisions through the 
difference that they make in them. 
This also has implications for theorizing organizational memory, i.e. remembering and 
forgetting, which is also becoming an important theme in organizational communication 
studies (Koschmann and McDonald, 2015; Langenmayr, 2016; Vasquez, Bencherki, Cooren, 
and Sergi, 2018). In the existing research on organizational communication, particularly as 
based on Taylor and Van Every’s (2000, 2011, 2014) work, texts, i.e. written or otherwise 
recorded communication, would be treated as sources of organizational memory, as these 
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texts preserve communications over time. With Luhmann, however, we might go a step 
further by acknowledging that what and how something is remembered in the organizational 
communication changes from communicative event to communicative event, as the meaning 
of these earlier communications are likely to change in that they make different differences in 
different ensuing communicative events. Apart from that, we would also have to acknowledge 
that beyond such texts, the organizational memory also manifests itself in the continuous 
impregnation of decisions through earlier decisions, as we described above.  
Thus, for organizational communication scholars interested in understanding the 
workings of the organizational memory it is not enough to examine organizational texts but 
they will have to follow and examine the ongoing flow of communications. They will have to 
capture the ongoing impregnation and re-impregnation of communications through earlier 
communications. In other words, they will have to longitudinally observe what these texts 
concretely become in further communications. This will not only reveal how the past is 
reflected in the present communications but also how it is forgotten, that is, how it is made not 
to make a difference anymore. On that basis, we might also look into how in each individual 
moment of communication it is determined what earlier communications are allowed to make 
or not to make a difference.  
Exploring the self-referential production of organizational boundaries 
As indicated above, Luhmann’s approach has important implications for the treatment 
of organizational boundaries, which differs from the existing conceptualizations in the 
communication literature. The Luhmannian perspective on boundaries indeed pushes us to 
explore how the organization recognizes whether a communication belongs to the 
organization or not. Every communication has to determine what other communications it can 
connect to as part of the same organization; for example, should earlier communications be 
treated just as gossip or as decisions and hence as part of the organization. In other words, the 
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organization has to determine whether earlier decision communications can be treated as 
decision communications and hence as basis for the present decision communication, or 
whether they should rather be ignored as gossip.  
For organizational communication scholars who want to follow Luhmann’s approach, 
this means that we should explore in more detail the mechanisms through which at each 
moment in time the organization determines whether something is deemed a decision or not. 
This includes questions about the right to speak on behalf of the organization, i.e. the right to 
communicate decisions, but it is likely to include also other aspects such as the extent to 
which the earlier communication itself referred to yet earlier communications and thereby 
embedded itself in the network of decision communications.  
And even for organization scholars who do not want to follow Luhmann in 
conceptualizing organizations as consisting of decisions only, there are important insights that 
can be drawn from his approach. Organizational communication researchers so far have 
typically addressed the question of boundaries in terms of the voices that are allowed to talk 
in the name of the organization (typically the ones of CEOs or official spokespersons, but 
also, in some contexts, the ones of salespersons or representatives) and thereby also define 
what the organization does and says (Cooren, Brummans and Charrieras, 2008; McPhee and 
Iverson, 2009; McPhee and Zaug, 2000; Smith and Ward, 2015). In this way, these voices 
also delimit what belongs and does not belong to the organization, that is, it is these voices 
that are supposed to define for the organization what it communicates. 
While initially this right to speak on behalf of the organization was implicitly 
associated with a kind of membership of the organization, newer studies (Christensen, 
Morsing and Thyssen, 2011, 2013; Cooren, in press; Schoeneborn and Trittin, 2013; Trittin 
and Schoeneborn, 2017) have highlighted the “polyphonic nature” of organizational 
communications, i.e. the fact that “several voices are combined into a complex concept in 
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which the individual voices can remain independent identities instead of being integrated into 
one monophonic voice or instead of being dominated by another homophonic voice”  (Castélo 
et al. 2013: 688). As pointed out, there is a wide range of voices that can speak about the 
organization which goes beyond the ones of the organizational members (top and middle 
managers, spokespersons, employees) and includes other stakeholders (clients, suppliers, 
citizens, activists, politicians, journalists, etc.). Thus, in the recent debate on the polyphonic 
nature of organizational communications the notion of boundaries has become less clear-cut 
than it originally was. 
Against this background, Luhmannian’s perspective provides an important imput to 
this recent debate in drawing attention to the fact that there is an important asymmetry in this 
polyphonic game: only some of the voices are treated as authorized to speak on its behalf. 
With Luhmann, we would have to trace back this authorization to the communication process, 
and particularly to the decision process, itself. Although, as various communication scholars 
(Cooren, in press; Schoeneborn and Trittin, 2013; Trittin and Schoeneborn, 2017) have 
recently argued, many voices can talk about what the organization says or does (a talking 
about that can have important effects on its reputation and therefore on its image and 
constitution), with Luhmann we have to acknowledge that only authorized voices, e.g. of 
persons who have been appointed through the organizational decisions as representatives of 
the organization, can really communicate in the name or on behalf of or for the organization.  
In other words, making an organization speak is, of course, not a free-for-all. This 
means that the polyphonicity of an organization could often be better compared to a concert 
where some are lead vocalists and take the central stage (the official spokespersons), while 
others are reduced to the role of backup singers (i.e., other employees, if they are allowed to 
sing!) or members of the crowd attending the concert (i.e., stakeholders). Although an 
organization constitutively is, to a certain extent, at the mercy of what is generally said about 
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it, i.e., its reputation, Luhmann would point out that the organization also has the advantage, 
in normal circumstances, of deciding what voice are allowed to speak on its behalf, hence 
distinguishing itself from its environment and what it can say about it. Taking this 
perspective, thus, pushes organizational communication scholars, and particularly those with 
an interest in the polyphony of organizational voices, to explore how an organization can 
decide what is said in its name and thereby what it is made to say. 
Such an exploration of how organizations decide who speaks in its name would have 
to go beyond an examination of how membership is communicatively constituted. After all, 
organizational members are not generally authorized to speak on behalf of the organization. 
Instead, the rights to speak on behalf of the organization are typically delimited according to 
topics and situations. For example, a salesperson might speak on behalf of the organization 
with regard to a particular sales situation but might not be authorized to do so in some other 
contexts. Hence, as researchers we would have to examine how those rights to speak are 
communicatively decided across people, contexts and topics. 
Exploring agency as a communicative phenomenon 
 Luhmann’s conceptualization of organizations as self-reproducing systems of 
communications urges communication scholars to trace all organizational operations back to 
communications. Taking this seriously means that we have to treat even what other 
communication theories refer to as human agency as a communicative phenomenon. This has 
important implications for organizational communication scholarship. While the existing 
literature has already partly acknowledged the communicative underpinnings of human 
agency (Cooren 2000; 2010, 2015), Luhmann’s approach takes this a decisive step further. 
Treating human agency as communicative phenomenon does not make human beings 
irrelevant (as highlighted above, organizational communication could not happen without 
human beings), but their agency has to be conceived of as determined by the network of 
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communications. In other words, whether and, if so, what difference people make to what 
happens in communication has to be understood as determined by the network of 
organizational communications in which they participate. For the organizational 
communication researcher, this implies a reversal of the traditional approach to examining 
communications. Rather than starting from the individuals as source or origin of 
communications, the researcher has to start with the ongoing flow of communications and 
examine in what way it opens itself up to “irritations” from individual human beings, which it 
then uses as material for constructing further communications.  
Above we explained the relation between the organization and human beings with the 
analogy of how we make use of the results of the complex operations of the computer for our 
own purposes, even though we do not understand the internal workings of the computer nor 
the computer understands how we think. We just open ourselves up to “irritations” from the 
computer and turn them into differences that make a difference in our thinking. Thus, even 
though less predictable than a computer, the organization can open itself up to human beings 
to produce irritations that are then used as basis for producing communications. For the 
organizational communication researcher this raises the important empirical question about 
how organizations determine where and how they open themselves up to these irritations from 
human beings.  
To take again the computer analogy, as human beings we typically open ourselves up 
to what appears on the computer screen but not to the flow of electricity in the cables, and we 
only open ourselves up to some content on the screen ignoring others. Analogously, 
organizations open themselves up to be “irritated” by some operations by some human beings 
and not to others. In other words, we might trace the internal communication processes that 
determine where and how the communication processes open themselves up to particular 
irritations from particular human beings. In this regard we might look at decisions about 
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memberships or decisions about forms of participation as those decisions are ultimately about 
what irritations are likely to be used as basis for the production of further decisions. 
This general line of argument about human agency has also implications for the recent 
debate on leadership in the organizational communication literature (Clifton, 2015, 2017; 
Holm and Fairhurst, 2018, Larsson, 2017; Larsson and Lundholm, 2013). While this literature 
is focusing on how organizational leadership is communicatively enacted and co-constructed, 
the Luhmannian perspective also draws attention to the complex interrelation between the 
realm of communication and the individual human beings. Thus, rather than just examining 
how leadership materializes in communication, taking Luhmann seriously invites us to 
examine also where and how this very communication opens itself up to irritations from 
individual human beings and how the respective irritations are then, in turn, processed in 
communication. In this way, the focus is placed on the way in which the communication 
makes use of human being in constructing leadership. 
Going beyond an examination of human agency per se, the Luhmannian approach also 
invites examinations of how human agency is referred to and thus constructed in the 
communication process itself. As we outlined before, decisions tend to be explicitly attributed 
to leaders or decision makers, as if the realized communications were under their control. In 
other words, the organization treats decisions as if they were the product of a decision maker 
rather than the product of the communication system itself. For organization communication 
scholars this offers interesting new lines of inquiry. One concerns the different functions that 
such fictions might serve. Luhmann himself already highlighted that attributing 
communications to human beings makes it easier to identify and communicate about the 
communications (Luhmann, 1995) and it also helps disguising the paradox of decision 
communications (Luhmann, 2018). In addition to that, one can think of a lot of other potential 
functions. For example, it might help redirecting responsibility for organizational failures 
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away from the organization itself to the fictional decision makers. This, in a second step, also 
offers the opportunity to be seen to resolve the source of the problem by sacking the 
respective people, i.e. by withdrawing their rights to speak. 
Another potential line of inquiry concerns the mechanisms of creating and sustaining 
the fiction of the decision maker. In this respect it might be particularly interesting to explore 
instances in which such fictions are contested. For example, often we find explicit attempts at 
countering attempted attributions of decision communications by redirecting attention back to 
the network of decisions – “I just followed the procedures.” For example, in our own work 
(Cooren, 2010) we showed how Adolf Eichmann in his trial tried to counter the attribution of 
decisions to him as a person by arguing that he just executed what had already been decided 
before.  
 The acknowledgement of the communicative constitution of human agency also has 
important methodological consequences. If we accept that the meaning realized in the 
communicative process is independent from what people meant to say, researchers can 
concentrate on capturing the realized communications and do not have to be concerned with 
human beings’ intentions. What matters are the communicatively realized meanings, not what 
is going on in people’s head. In other words, the doings of human beings only matter as far as 
they function as decision premises for future decisions, that is, only if they enter the 
communication network as information feeding utterances feeding understanding. To a certain 
extent, our acts and their consequences speak for themselves, as determined by ensuing 
communications, and this is what the Luhmannian approach acknowledges by insisting on 
their communicative dimension. 
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HOW THE EXISTING RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
CAN INSPIRE LUHMANN’S THEORY 
 Luhmann’s work has not only the potential to inspire organizational communication 
scholars but also vice versa. In the following we will highlight three areas of such inspiration. 
Interpenetration as a logic of reciprocal appropriation 
 As we explained above, Luhmann characterizes the relation between organizations and 
human beings as interpenetration; that is, organizations mobilize the complexity of the human 
beings as if it were their own. This form of appropriation is essential to be able to talk about 
autopoiesis, i.e., self-production, as an organization produces itself through appropriating 
what others end up doing and saying in its name or for it, whether intentionally or not 
(Bencherki and Cooren, 2011). This interpenetration logic allows Luhmann to talk about 
organizations as doing this or that, even if he does not really elaborate on how this is possible. 
In this regard, Luhmann’s approach could be enriched with insights from the existing 
organizational communication literature, which might explain how this interpenetration is 
made possible (Cooren, 2010; McPhee and Zaug, 2000; Taylor and Van Every, 2000). If 
organizations can communicate, it is because agents are deemed as authorized to 
communicate on its behalf, an authority/authoring that is, of course, based on decisions about 
who can speak in its name (Benoit Barné and Cooren, 2009; Taylor and Van Every, 2014).  
 This point insists on what allows organizations to be positioned as actors making a 
difference in the world in which they evolve. It also insists on the key role communications 
play in this attribution (see especially Bencherki and Bourgoin, in press). In order to act and 
speak, an organization has, by definition, to rely on voices (the ones of CEOs, spokespersons, 
salespersons etc.) that position themselves or are positioned as speaking on its behalf, making 
it present, for another next first time, in various situations (Cooren, 2015). This means that 
appropriation is always relative and reciprocal. Relative because organizational appropriation 
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is always partial, that is, organizations can never completely own other systems’ actions; 
reciprocal because voices have their organizations as much as organizations have them.  
 This means that these voices also mobilize the complexity of their respective 
organizations as if it were their own, hence the effect of authority that are so crucial in 
organizational settings (Cooren, 2015; Taylor and Van Every, 2000). Appropriation is 
therefore a two-way relationship, which means that the phenomenon of autopoiesis always 
has to be analyzed in both directions: from the organization to the systems it appropriates, but 
also from these systems to the organization they also appropriate. We believe that it is through 
this logic of interpenetration that the becoming of organizations can and should be studied. 
This also explains why communications appear so central in this endeavor as it is, by 
excellence, where this interpenetration takes place (Bencherki and Bourgoin, in press). Thus, 
as we are arguing here, existing works on organizational communication can enrich our 
understanding of the interpenetration between organization and human beings that Luhmann 
described. 
Heteropoiesis and the hybrid character of agency 
Another key point, related to the previous one, concerns the question of autopoiesis or 
self-production, which, as we described above, is at the core of Luhmann’s systems theory. 
Although Luhmann highlights the autopoietic nature of organizations, he also notes that this 
identification results from the way the phenomenon is observed. For instance, if top 
managers, who communicate in the name of their organization, ratify a strategic plan, the 
organization reproduces itself with this specific document (hence the autopoietic dimension of 
this move). However, we could point out that this self-organization also depends on a sort of 
alter- or hetero-poiesis, which other communicative perspectives allow us to examine (e.g., 
Cooren, 2010).  
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By ratifying this strategic plan, the organization precisely produces a text that now has 
the capacity to tell or remind the organization itself (through, for instance, its top managers) 
what should be done in the future with regard to its strategy. This phenomenon not only 
highlights the hybrid character of agency, to the extent that it shows that not only humans, but 
also texts and other devices communicate for the organization (Cooren, 2004; Cooren and 
Bencherki, 2010; Putnam and Cooren, 2004, Vásquez, Bencherki, Cooren and Sergi, 2018), 
but it also shows that autopoiesis is always relative, depending on the point of reference one 
decides to choose and focus on. 
Although the relative character of autopoiesis was implicitly acknowledged by 
Luhmann, especially through the concept of interpenetration mentioned above, we believe 
that its implications in terms of heteropoiesis were never fully examined. Seen from the 
organization’s perspective, there is indeed self-production as the strategic plan has been 
created for that very purpose and is appropriated by the organization. However, seen from the 
top managers’ or even the strategic plan’s perspectives, it is their own contributions that 
organize, at least partly, the organization regarding its strategic features. For Luhmann, the 
strategic plan and the top managers who ratified it function merely as an irritation that is 
appropriated by the network of communication. Yet, we can also highlight the specific 
contributions of these irritations, which cannot be reduced to their appropriations.  
Luhmann’s characterization of organizations as autopoietic appears to position them as 
autonomous even though autopoiesis has, by definition, to rely on heteropoiesis, which is left 
as a black box (see also Schoeneborn, 2011, on the limitations of Luhmann’s approach in 
addressing human and nonhuman agency). To use another example, when a company makes 
the rounds of potential customers, it relies on specific resources that will possibly make it 
autonomous (a salesperson, a cellular phone, a company car, a computer, samples, brochures, 
etc.) but this autonomy is, of course, relative, as it precisely relies on the salespersons, 
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technologies and texts it mobilizes to autonomously do things. In other words, its own 
autonomy, relies, by definition, on a certain heteronomy, as it is still at the mercy of what its 
salespersons and all the things they will mobilize will do or not do for it.  
Appropriation, as we see, is a key aspect of autopoiesis and autonomy, but 
appropriation cannot be absolute precisely because it remains to some extent always 
improper, heteronomous, as the human and nonhuman agents that are mobilized to assure 
self-production have their own autonomy, that is, they are themselves governed by their own 
laws (Cooren, 2010). This puts Luhmann’s point in perspective, as it shows that autopoiesis 
also depends on forms of alter- or hetero-poiesis. If, as Luhmann reminds us, the 
identification of autopoiesis depends on how it is observed and analysed, it means, by 
definition, that this phenomenon is relative and always depends on how the activities of its 
elements are appropriated by the organization itself (Bencherki and Cooren, 2011; Bencherki 
and Snapp, 2016) 
Organization and organs outside formal organizations 
 With his conceptualization of organizations as recursive network of decisions, 
Luhmann focused on what is usually referred to as “formal organizations.” However, some 
organizational communication scholars, echoing Karl Weick’s (1979) notion of “organizing,” 
have propagated a wider notion of organization beyond formal organizations (Taylor and Van 
Every, 2000, 2011, 2014), especially through the concept of organizationality (Dobusch and 
Schoeneborn, 2015; Schoeneborn, Kuhn and Kärreman, 2019). In our own work (Cooren and 
Fairhurst, 2009: 121), we have tried to illustrate this with the example of a group of friends 
who decide to help each other move: 
For example, a group of individuals can organize themselves to accomplish a common 
objective (for example, moving) and develop some patterns of interaction, but this 
does not necessarily mean that this group constitutes a formal organization (for 
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example, a moving company). They could just be a bunch of friends trying to help one 
of them to move. 
 In a step to widen Luhmann’s organization theory to such organizational phenomena 
beyond formal organizations, we could introduce the concept of organs as we suggested 
elsewhere (Cooren, 2015, Cooren and Matte, in press). Organs can be understood 
etymologically as instruments or means designed for specific purpose.1 Whether we are 
talking about a simple to-do list we decide to write and then follow during the day, a software 
that automatically dispatches the closest ambulance for an emergency, or a strategic plan that 
detail various courses of action that a company ought to take in the future, we are dealing with 
organs to the extent that they actively contribute to the organ-izing of activities, that is, they 
actively structure various courses of action in order to fulfill specific objectives (Cooren and 
Matte, in press). 
 While we agree with Luhmann that decisions are key aspects of organizations, we 
believe that Luhmann hasn’t recognized the important role that organs play in their 
constitution. These organs certainly have to be decided upon and Luhmann importantly 
remind us about that, but these decisions precisely lead to the creation of organs and it is these 
organs that, by definition, structure and organize systems while being part of them (hence, 
their autopoietic dimension). For instance, as soon as a group collectively decides about a 
specific course of action, they are getting organ-ized because they found a way not only to 
speak with one voice (they created an organ of phonation, so to speak), but also to divide 
labour (which amounts to creating various intermediaries or means by which collective action 
will take place). Decisions are therefore crucial for organizing, but the product of these 
decisions are also crucial, i.e., organs.  
                                                 
1 While the terminology of organ could be accused of biologizing the reflection on organization and organizing, 
one could retort that biology actually appropriated this term, which initially meant instrument or means.  
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 Current communicative perspectives thus invite us to extend Luhmann’s treatment of 
organizations to organizing more generally. Echoing Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2011) idea of 
partial organization and Dobusch and Schoeneborn’s (2015) notion of organizationality, we 
can speak of organization outside formal organizations whenever key aspects are decided 
upon – even though not everything is necessarily decided (see also Ahrne, Brunnson and 
Seidl, 2017). This shows that Luhmann’s theory can also apply to organizing, and not only 
organizations. Organizing indeed implies deciding upon the creation of organs that will 
organize a group of people (or even just oneself). Since organs are also systems, it also means 
that they constitute sources of heteropoiesis whose effects can also be studied for their own 
sake.  
CONCLUSION 
In this essay we have tried to raise the awareness of organization and management 
scholars for the importance of Niklas Luhmann’s communication approach to organizations, 
which has hitherto been treated only superficially and sporadically in organization studies 
internationally. We have argued that Luhmann’s approach offers exciting new insights into 
the ways in which communication shapes organizations and thereby opens up new avenues 
particularly to organization communication scholarship. We have tried to demonstrate that 
adopting a Luhmannian approach (1) puts decisions back into organizational communication 
research, (2) invites us to explore how communications as events without duration produce 
organizational continuity, (3) urges us to examine how communications establish 
organizational boundaries and (4) directs our attention to the ways in which agency is 
communicatively established. We argued in turn that the Luhmannian approach can also be 
enriched with insights from other organizational communication research regarding questions 
related to (1) inter-penetration as a logic of reciprocal appropriation, (2) the heteropoietic and 
hybrid dimension of autopoiesis and (3) organization and organs outside formal organizations. 
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 This discussion about mutual inspirations between theoretical perspectives raises the 
more general question about the relation between various approaches to organizational 
communication, which are based on very different theoretical traditions and associated 
assumptions (Schoeneborn 2011; Schoeneborn et al., 2014). As a consequence, there is no 
point in attempting to integrate them. Apart from problems of incommensurability, attempts at 
integration would also reduce the potential richness of insights resulting from the pluralism of 
theories – analogously to the pluralism of theories in organization studies in general (Scherer, 
1998). However, as we have tried to illustrate in this Review Essay there is a potential for 
cross-fertilization between these different theories. We showed how key insights from a 
Luhmannian approach might invite and inspire scholars to address aspects of the 
communicative constitution of organizations that they might otherwise miss – and vice versa. 
Hence, with this review essay we also hope to encourage more fruitful dialogue across the 
different theoretical strands (for an example of such a dialogue, see Schoeneborn et al, 2014). 
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